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Quantum key distribution is rising as an important cryptographic primitive for protecting the com-
munication infrastructure in the digital era. However, its implementation security is often weakened
by components whose behavior deviates from what is expected. Here, we analyse the response of
a self-differencing avalanche photodiode, a key enabler for high speed quantum key distribution, to
intense light shone from a continuous-wave laser. Under incorrect settings, the cancellation entailed
by the self-differencing circuitry can make the detector insensitive to single photons. However, we
experimentally demonstrate that even in such cases intensity modulation can be used as an effective
measure to restore the detector’s expected response to the input light.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises information
theoretic security that is guaranteed by the laws of quan-
tum mechanics [1]. Its potential as a cryptographic prim-
itive has stimulated significant developments in recent
years and has resulted in pilot network field trials in sev-
eral continents [2–8]. However, actual components in
QKD implementations can deviate from their ideal be-
haviour, creating side-channels that might be exploited
by an eavesdropper (Eve), thus threatening the theoret-
ical security promised by QKD [9–14].
To mitigate this security risk, active or passive coun-
termeasures can be considered. In an active approach,
the legitimate QKD users (Alice and Bob) monitor in
real time the device parameters that change under Eve’s
attack [15, 16]. In a passive approach, they add extra
guarding components to thaw Eve’s attempt [17, 18]. Us-
ing the Trojan-horse attack [19, 20] as an example, Alice
and Bob can employ either a watchdog detector to ac-
tively detect Eve’s presence [21] or a combination of an
optical filter, attenuator and isolator to passively prevent
Eve’s light from reaching the encoding devices [17].
Single photon detectors are the most vulnerable com-
ponent in a QKD system, especially when inappropri-
ately operated [22, 23], due to their optical exposure
to Eve through the quantum channel. Those based
on semiconductor avalanche photodiodes (APDs) can be
attacked using a strong optical signal in the so-called
“blinding attack” [9, 10]. The severity of this attack has
motivated a number of active countermeasures, including
monitoring the APD current [22], varying [24, 25] or cal-
ibrating [16] in real time its detection efficiency, or using
a watchdog detector [26]. Extraordinarily, detector side-
channel free QKD [27, 28] closes all side channels in the
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measurement devices, but requires significant changes in
users’ apparatus and does not offer an easy upgrade to
existing systems.
Self-differencing (SD) InGaAs APDs are an important
class of detectors for high bit rate QKD systems [29, 30].
They enable detection of extremely weak signals using a
passive circuit for cancellation of the intense background
capacitive response [31], thus supporting count rates in
the GHz range [32], detection efficiency up to 55% [33],
room-temperature operation [34] and superior resilience
to background noise photons [35]. On the other hand,
the self-cancellation nature of the SD circuit prevents the
detection of consecutive identical signals [36]. This might
be exploited by Eve to perform the blinding attack with
a lower optical power [37], especially for certain settings
of the detector [23].
Here, we propose taking preemptive action against
blinding by placing an intensity modulator (IM) in front
of the receiver’s measurement apparatus. The use of low
extinction ratio modulation will not severely attenuate
the incoming quantum signal, but the IM will create suf-
ficient modulation in the detector’s photocurrent, which
is detectable by SD circuitry and discrimination electron-
ics. We experimentally demonstrate this method on an
SD InGaAs APD.
This idea is similar in spirit to the random variation
of an APD’s detection efficiency, suggested and partially
implemented in [24], which was shown to be ineffective
against a refined Eve’s attack [25]. However, our pro-
posal contains some notable differences. An APD en-
dowed with an SD circuit sets a more challenging target
to the eavesdropper. In fact, Eve has to send sequen-
tial light pulses with identical intensity to cause blind-
ing. Any small deviation from this condition is likely to
cause a detection event with an associated 50% quan-
tum bit error rate (QBER). At the same time, a long
sequence of bright optical pulses generates a high pho-
tocurrent which is easily detectable [38]. When an IM
2with random modulation is added on top of this already
compelling situation, the constraints for Eve become ex-
tremely stringent. In particular, we found no room for
blinding in our experiment.
II. BLINDING ATTACKS AND
COUNTERMEASURES
Single photon sensitivity of an APD relies on having
an electrical excess bias above its breakdown voltage to
enable avalanche multiplication of a single photo-carrier.
In the blinding attacks, Eve erodes this excess by in-
ducing an electrical current flowing through the biasing
circuit [22] or heating up the device to raise its break-
down voltage [39]. These attacks are realised through
injecting a strong laser signal into Bob’s module through
the quantum channel and making both of his detectors
blind, i.e., insensitive to single photons. At this point,
Eve performs a modified intercept-resend attack to take
control of Bob’s detectors. She measures the state pre-
pared by Alice and re-sends a suitably prepared faked
state encoded in a strong optical pulse. This will then
trigger a detector count only when Bob chooses a mea-
surement basis that is identical to Eve’s. In this attack,
Eve can gain full information about the final key [40].
Consider an APD detector operated in Geiger mode
with an excess voltage of V 0ex, as shown in Fig. 1(a). To
completely erode this excess and blind the detector, Eve
needs to create a photocurrent I that can be approxi-
mated as
I =
V 0ex
Rbias +Rapd +Rs/2
, (1)
where Rbias, Rapd and Rs are the resistance values for the
biasing resistor, the APD itself and the sensing resistor,
respectively. In a usual setup, Rbias = 0 and the current
is determined mainly by the value of Rapd. Its typical
value is on the order of 1 mA, see Fig. 1(b). This large
current, together with the gain modulation effect by the
detector gating, has previously enabled gated-APDs to
avoid the blinding attack when their discrimination levels
are appropriately set [22].
Here we propose a different measure, schematically
shown in Fig. 1(c). We insert an IM, driven by a quan-
tum random number generator (QRNG), in front of the
optical fibre input of the APD detector and an SD cir-
cuit after its electrical signal output. The SD circuit
splits the APD output into two equal components, delays
one of them, and then combines the two signals differen-
tially, see Fig. 1(d). The positive peaks of the resulting
photocurrent can then be detected by the discrimination
electronics.
The IM acts as an optical shutter and stops any in-
coming light for a short duration at random times. Un-
der normal conditions, i.e., in the absence of Eve, this
would cause a decrease in the counts seen by Bob every
time the IM is activated. Correspondingly, the resulting
FIG. 1. (a) Schematic of a biasing scheme for a gated APD.
VDC : DC bias component; VAC : AC bias component; Rbias:
biasing resistor; Rapd: APD internal resistance; Rs: sensing
resistor. (b) Reduction in the excess bias due to photocurrent.
(c) Schematic of the measure against blinding. IM: intensity
modulator; QRNG: quantum random number generator; SD:
Self-Differencer. (d) Effect of the intensity modulation on the
SD photocurrent in presence of bright light inputted by Eve.
avalanche current would exhibit a waveform containing
a positive current peak followed by a negative dip. On
the contrary, if Eve sends her blinding pulses into Bob’s
module, the IM’s activation would increase the counts
seen by Bob, due to the SD effect, and the resulting pho-
tocurrent would exhibit a negative current dip followed
by a positive peak. Because this outcome is distinctively
different from that under normal conditions, it represents
a clear signature of Eve’s presence.
Even without correlating Bob’s counts to the IM’s ac-
tivation times, the presence of the IM and SD circuitry
make it possible to restore the APD’s count rate and pre-
vent its blinding. This is a simple consequence of the fact
that, irrespective of the polarity of the photocurrent, the
positive peak is always well above the detector’s discrim-
ination level, for a detector that has been correctly set
up. So, for simplicity, we decided to not take advantage in
this work of the “fine-grained” signatures based on corre-
lating the counts with the IM or based on the avalanche’s
polarity and focus rather on the “coarse-grained” signa-
ture represented by the APD’s counts. The analysis of
the whole statistics available to Bob is left for future stud-
ies and can only reinforce the results presented here.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
To investigate the efficacy of the proposed measure, we
adopt the experimental setup shown in Fig. 2, which in-
cludes both an IM and an SD circuit. An InGaAs/InP
APD is thermo-electrically cooled to –30 ◦C and oper-
ated with a constant DC bias of 51.6 V and a 1 GHz
square-wave signal with a peak-to-peak amplitude of 4.6
V. A telecom C-band continuous wave laser diode emit-
ting polarised light is used to illuminate the APD. The
APD resistance is measured to be Rapd = 1 kΩ, and no
3FIG. 2. Experimental setup. Pu.G.: Pulse Generator;
Pa.G.: Pattern Generator; SMU: Source Measure Unit; LD:
Laser Diode; VOA: Variable Optical Attenuator; IM: In-
tensity Modulator; APD: Avalanche Photodiode; SD: Self-
Differencer.
biasing resistor is used, Rbias = 0. We use a variable
optical attenuator to provide a 120 dB intensity varia-
tion range and a LiNbO3 intensity modulator driven by
a pattern generator to modulate the optical power. A
high-bandwidth oscilloscope (16 GHz) is used to analyze
the SD output. We determine the appropriate discrimi-
nation level for the SD-APD to be 18 mV and measure
a detection efficiency of 26% for pulsed light and a dark
count rate of 23 kHz at this level. We note that under
this operation condition it is not possible for Eve to blind
the detector using continuous-wave illumination because
the increasing APD capacitive response is sufficient to
counter Eve’s blinding effort [41].
IV. EFFECT OF THE INTENSITY
MODULATION ON THE COUNT RATE
We first demonstrate an experimental condition un-
der which the SD-APD can be blinded. By deliberately
setting the discrimination level inappropriately high, at
26 mV, we measure the count rate of the SD-APD as
a function of incident optical power measured directly
after the IM. Here, the RF input to the IM is disabled
and its DC bias is adjusted to have a maximum trans-
mission. Figure 3 shows the count rate and photocurrent
as a function of the incident optical power. The detec-
tor exhibits a blinding gap between 300 µW and 3 mW,
within which the detector count rate falls to zero. Such
a blinding gap enables Eve to gain complete control of
the detector. The photocurrent follows the count rate
and grows linearly before the count rate saturation, and
then grows sub-linearly (100 nW – 1µW) before becoming
quasi-linear with the incident optical power (> 1µW). In
the blinding gap, the photocurrent is measured to exceed
1 mA.
Such a large photocurrent offers an opportunity to
close the blinding gap by modulating the intensity of the
attacking signal. As illustrated earlier with Fig. 1(d), an
intensity modulation creates a dip in the photocurrent.
The SD circuit converts each dip to a positive peak which
FIG. 3. The detector count rate in the case of an inappropri-
ately high discrimination level and associated photocurrent as
a function of the incident optical power. Count rate and pho-
tocurrent can be simultaneously measured and pose stringent
constraints on Eve’s actions.
can trigger the detector discrimination circuit when there
is sufficient modulation depth. A random pattern pro-
duces photocurrent dips at a rate that is 1/4 of the sig-
nal clock rate. For simplicity we simulate this rate in our
experiment by applying an RF signal to the IM using
a repetitive modulation pattern “0001”, which we label
as “1/4” modulation. We set the RF amplitude to 4 V,
achieving half-wave modulation and an intensity extinc-
tion ratio of 23 dB. This pattern carves a 1 ns hole for
every 4 ns duration in the attacking light intensity.
Using the ill-set discrimination level of 26 mV, we mea-
sure the count rate versus the incident optical power
with the result shown as black solid circles in Fig. 4(a).
The intensity modulation causes distinctively different
count rate behavior for higher optical power when com-
pared with the case without intensity modulation (open
squares). The count rate stays above 250 MHz from
100 nW to 7.5 mW, without any sign of it falling. De-
spite the high discrimination level, the IM successfully
removes the former SD-APD’s blinding gap.
We attribute the closure of the blinding gap to the
applied intensity modulation. To illustrate this, we
compare two SD-APD output waveforms recorded un-
der vastly different optical powers. In the single pho-
ton counting regime, the APD produces a positive, cur-
rent spike and therefore its SD output becomes a positive
spike followed by its negative copy 1 ns afterwards, see
waveform 1 in Fig. 4 (b). With an optical power of 1 mW,
the SD-APD output waveform reverses its polarity (wave-
form 2) because the intensity modulation carves a hole in
the photocurrent, instead of a current spike for a single-
photon induced avalanche. The signal level is about 9
times as strong as the single-photon induced avalanche,
and can therefore overcome the detector discrimination
level. This confirms the intuition given at the beginning
of the paper. For the case of 1/4 modulation, the count
rate saturates close to 750 MHz, which can be explained
4FIG. 4. (a) APD count rates as a function of incident opti-
cal power with different modulations applied to the intensity
modulator. An RF amplitude of 4 V is used to produce half-
wave modulation and a modulation extinction ratio of 23 dB.
(b) The SD output recorded by the oscilloscope at points (1)
and (2) in (a) with the attacking laser being modulated by a
“1/32” pattern. (c) Signal level of the main positive peak as
a function of optical power.
by having two ripples after the main avalanche peak in
Fig. 4(b) overcoming the discrimination threshold as well.
Figure 4(c) plots the signal level of the main positive
peak induced by the IM as a function of incident optical
power. Over the incident power spanning over 4 orders
of magnitude between 0.7 µW and 7 mW, the IM in-
duced signal has a significant margin to overcome the
discrimination level, even though it was inappropriately
set. At an optical power of 1 µW , where the count rate
with no IM (open squares in Fig. 4(a)) begins to fall, the
signal level in Fig. 4(c) is over 50 mV and continues to
increase in amplitude to over 300 mV at an optical power
of greater than 1 mW. Within the power range Eve needs
for blinding, each intensity modulation is guaranteed to
produce at least one detector count. This is in agreement
with our experiment using sparser modulation patterns,
as shown in Fig. 4(a). A sparser modulation results in a
proportionally lower bottom-out count rate in the blind-
ing gap.
The significant margin in the signal level shown in
Fig. 4(c) offers room to relax the requirement on the
IM’s modulation contrast, thus minimising the loss that
the IM would introduce. We determine the lowest mod-
ulation contrast by measuring the count rate probability
as a function of the RF signal amplitude applied to the
IM with the DC set to maximum transmission. Here, the
modulation frequency is 1/128 of 1 GHz and the incident
optical power is 1 mW. As shown in Fig. 5, a modula-
tion signal with amplitude 0.3 V can always induce at
least one detector count. More counts are possible due
to the ripples in the output waveform also overcoming
the discrimination threshold. This RF level corresponds
to an intensity contrast of 0.06 dB. The number of counts
increases above unity at a modulation amplitude higher
than 1.5 V because the amplitude of the signal ripple (see
Fig. 4(b)) rises above the discrimination level.
FIG. 5. APD counts per IM activation and IM contrast as a
function of the AC signal driving the IM, for a constant inci-
dent optical power of 1 mW and a modulation pattern 1/128.
We note that the APD discrimination level is deliberately set
too high (26 mV) to enable blinding when the IM is switched
off.
V. INTENSITY MODULATION TO PREVENT
BLINDING
In this section we discuss how the IM represents a po-
tential countermeasure to the blinding attack. In doing
so, we exclude side effects due to imperfect electronics or
to a wrong setting of the parameters. We also neglect
any artificial additions used to facilitate post-processing
or software implemention, such as dead time, which may
be exploited by Eve with a modified attack [13]. We as-
sume that the IM is driven by a true random generator,
so Eve cannot deterministically predict the modulation
effect and prepare her blinding pulses accordingly. We
also consider a sufficient modulation depth to ensure a
strong signal difference between modulated and unmod-
ulated gates, which guarantees the occurrence of a detec-
tor count, as we have shown. The synchronization of the
IM pulses, as well as the differential delay of the SD cir-
cuit, must be carefully chosen such that the counts by IM
activation fall within the acceptance time window of the
QKD system. Finally, a spectral filter should be applied
in the QKD receiver to limit Eve’s choice of wavelength
5and ensure that the modulation effect on Eve’s attacking
signal takes place.
The main security observation is that each IM-induced
electrical signal overcomes the discrimination level and
deterministically generates at least one detector count.
These counts have equal probabilities of contributing a
correct or incorrect bit in the sifted key, thus generating
an overall 50% QBER. Therefore we can choose the prob-
ability to activate the IM, PIM , such that the resulting
QBER in the presence of Eve exceeds the security tol-
erance of the protocol. If this happens, the protocol is
aborted and no insecure key is distilled.
To decide the correct value for PIM , let us consider
the BB84 protocol [1], which features a security toler-
ance of 11%. Suppose that PIM = 25%. In this case,
we have a guarantee that if Eve always launches her at-
tack, Bob will see at least 1 click in 4 input pulses, which
would cause a QBER, Qb, equal to or larger than 12.5%.
In this case the key rate is zero, R(Qb) = 0. If Eve
works in “burst-mode”, she cannot do better than in
the previous scenario. On the N preparations effected
by Alice, she could intercept-and-resend Nb consecutive
blinding signals in bursts and mount her attack only on
these bursts, while blocking the remaining N −Nb quan-
tum signals. Even in this case, the IM would guaran-
tee the final QBER to be above 12.5%, causing zero key
rate. Moreover, at the beginning of the train of blinding
pulses prepared by Eve, the SD effect would cause one
additional count in Bob’s detectors, making this scenario
more favourable to the legitimate users.
On the other hand, Eve could let a fraction of Alice’s
signals pass undisturbed. In this case, Eve gets no in-
formation on the undisturbed signals, but the resulting
QBER would be smaller than the protocol’s tolerance
and the users would not abort the transmission. How-
ever this case is still secure due to the fact that the key
rate is a convex function of the QBER (see e.g. [42]).
Suppose that Cb and Cu (Qb and Qu) are the count rates
(QBERs) pertaining to blinding and undisturbed pulses,
respectively. Then the average QBER seen by the users
is Q = CbQb +CuQu. The convexity of the key rate and
the fact that R(Qb) = 0 imply that
R(Q) ≤ R(Qb) +R(Qu) = R(Qu), (2)
where R(Qb) and R(Qu) are the key rates from separate
blinding and undisturbed pulses, respectively. Eq. (2)
shows that there is at least a fraction R(Qu) of secure
bits in the users’ signals. This comes from the fact that
R(Qu) is associated with the undisturbed pulses. In the
real case, the users measure Q and distill a secure fraction
R(Q). This, by virtue of Eq. (2), is a pessimistic estimate
of the fraction of secure bits in the sample, hence the
protocol is secure.
VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In conclusion, we have devised and experimentally
demonstrated a new technique to mitigate detector blind-
ing. By using an intensity modulator and an SD cir-
cuit, we modulated the incoming light to create uneven
avalanches for the case of strong input light. Signifi-
cantly, whilst this protects the detector from Eve it only
introduces a small intrinsic attenuation of Alice’s signal.
We showed that a modulation depth of 0.06 dB is suf-
ficient to prevent an SD detector from being blinded.
In our experimental test, we adopted a continuous-wave
laser. A pulsed laser would be no more effective at blind-
ing an SD detector as it creates more intensity fluctua-
tions, to which the detector is very sensitive. Although
intensity modulation to prevent Eve’s faked-state attack
has been previously addressed in the literature [25], this
was concerned with controlling an already blinded detec-
tor. Our approach, on the contrary, includes a SD circuit
to prevent blinding in the first place and thus eliminate
the possibility of a faked-state attack at the root.
The proposed IM measure entails a considerable ex-
trinsic loss penalty of around 2.5–5 dB, arising from im-
perfect intensity modulators based on LiNbO3 and will
therefore negatively impact the secure key rate. The loss
associated with the product of the modulation rate of
1/4 and extinction ratio of 0.06 dB is comparatively neg-
ligible, hence the key rate in the presence of modula-
tion would be 0.315 times the unmodulated key rate and
the distance would be shortened by 25 km, assuming a
maximum insertion loss of 5 dB. Although QKD systems
typically have two or more detectors, placing an inten-
sity modulator in front of only one would be sufficient
to demonstrate the presence of Eve. We note that ex-
isting modulators were designed to achieve high modu-
lation depth which requires a lengthy crystal waveguide
for electro-optical interaction. With a reduced modula-
tion depth, the insertion loss can be made significantly
smaller, thereby alleviating the loss penalty. Although
intensity modulators are typically polarization sensitive,
Eve cannot mount an attack such that she simply sends
light of a polarization which does not experience modu-
lation. This is because the detectors in a QKD system
always see a fixed polarization, whether in phase-encoded
schemes such as [43], which contain an electronic polar-
ization controller followed by a polarizing beamsplitter
(PBS) or in polarization-encoded schemes, such as in [10],
which also have PBSs before the detectors. The use of
an IM also requires a random number generator (RNG).
Since Bob typically already has an RNG for the purpose
of active basis selection, he can use the same RNG oper-
ated at twice the clock rate for the IM, which would not
open additional side-channels.
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